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In the European Union, the notion of 
‘conditionality’ is back in vogue. When the 
European Commission presented its ideas for 
the next Multiannual Financial Framework, for 
instance, it proposed a new regulation linking 
EU spending to respect for the rule of law.1 
Deficiencies with regards to the latter, it was 
argued, could expose the Union to financial 
losses, thus warranting the Council to adopt 
prudential measures aimed at mitigating such 
risks. Irrespective of whether this proposal will 
survive the future budget negotiations and 
associated legislative procedures, one thing is 
clear. The European construction is set to 
feature the next round of debate on what 
constitutes appropriate – or even compulsory – 
policy behaviour for Member States of the EU, 
and what happens in cases of noncompliance 
with the norm. As such a debate is set to 
provoke substantial political controversy, 
fundamental questions arise regarding how the 
unity amongst member states can be protected 
whilst simultaneously avoiding the impression 
that ‘anything goes’. 
Based on the deliberations of an Egmont 
working group, this European Policy Brief 
explores the boundaries of the conditionality 
debate in the EU. It does not seek to advocate 
specific policy outcomes, but rather to assess 
what varying degrees of conditionality can and 
cannot achieve. In many ways, conditionality has 
always been part and parcel of the historical 
Conditionality in the EU comes in many 
forms: legally codified and enforced by the 
Court of Justice, or reliant on 
intergovernmental bargaining and 
expressed by means of political or economic 
(dis)incentives. This European Policy Brief 
explores the boundaries of the 
conditionality debate, and assesses what 
varying degrees of conditionality can and 
cannot achieve. The overarching objective 
of conditionality is to foster integration and 
cohesion amongst the peoples of Europe 
and their Member States. A sound logic of 
conditionality must therefore set incentives 
in such a way that their application 
contributes to this intended outcome. A 
balanced combination of political, legal and 
budgetary instruments can help remedy a 
major lacuna in the Treaties: the effective 
protection of the rule of law and democracy. 
  
 




process of European integration, yet important 
lacunae remain. In the first section, we discuss 
the empirical track record of conditionality and 
dissect its different institutional manifestations. 
At the same time, substantial unease in regards 
to rule of law backsliding exists in many 
European democracies. Given that this relates to 
the very foundations of the EU as a legal 
construct, it bears little surprise that the rule of 
law discussion has emerged as the proverbial 
mother of all conditionality debates. The second 
section therefore reviews several of the policy 
proposals that have been put forward in this 
regard, while commenting on their merits and 
drawbacks. In the third and final section, the 
dynamic interplay between various 
conditionality-based mechanisms is discussed. 
As these mechanisms encompass political, legal 
and budgetary instruments, the need to ensure 
overall coherence is key. If European unity is to 
mean anything, different policy discussions must 
be linked together into a coherent package. 
 
THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF 
CONDITIONALITY 
The concept of conditionality has a long 
pedigree in European studies. Much of the EU 
acquis is based on the logic of conditionality: the 
benefits of integration come with adherence to a 
commonly agreed legal framework. Yet 
conditionality can go beyond the acquis and even 
be used as an instrument of coercion. This logic 
of sticks and carrots comes with its own 
dynamic that is not always easy to reconcile with 
the spirit of European integration. When 
discussing options to resort to greater 
conditionality in the EU, it is imperative to 
carefully delineate what sort of conditionality 
one has in mind, and heed not only the intended 
outcomes it can generate, but also the associated 
costs and pitfalls. 
The logic of conditionality is part and parcel of 
compliance with the EU acquis. Examples of 
Treaty-based conditionality abound. Under 
Article 122 TFEU, the Union may provide, “in a 
spirit of solidarity” and “under certain 
conditions”, financial assistance to a Member 
State in difficulties caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences. In turn, Article 136 
TFEU sets the stage for budgetary and 
economic policy surveillance within the euro 
area. Under Article 328 TFEU Member States 
may pursue enhanced cooperation, “subject to 
compliance with any conditions of participation 
laid down by the authorising decision”. At a 
more general level, the logic of conditionality is 
also a constitutive element of the EU accession 
process, by means of the Copenhagen criteria, 
or that of becoming a Eurozone member, by 
means of the convergence criteria. 
Unsurprisingly, a rich scholarly literature exists 
on the different manifestations of such Treaty-
based conditionality.2 In case of non-compliance 
with EU legislation, recourse to the Court of 
Justice is possible for conducting infringement 
procedures, and enforcement mechanisms are in 
place. 
At the same time, the notion of conditionality 
may also refer to a political logic of sanctions 
and rewards for specific policy behaviour. In 
some respects, such forms of coercive 
diplomacy do in fact relate to how the EU 
operates as a political entity in its external 
relations, for instance by imposing economic 
sanctions. Yet as the EU itself is defined as a 
contract amongst member states (Article 1 
TEU) based on shared values (Article 2 TEU), 
Article 7 TEU offers a mechanism for 
suspending membership rights. This constitutes 
the singular stick the EU can wield vis-à-vis its 
own constitutive members – thus exposing an 
important lacuna in the Treaties. In turn, carrots 
are much more prevalent in intra-EU debates, 
be it in the form of financial incentives or other 
sweeteners, such as political prestige or 








It bears emphasis that such political 
conditionality is by no means limited to the EU. 
Rather, it is part and parcel of the rough world 
of international relations. When US Secretary of 
Defence Jim Mattis attended his first NATO 
defence ministerial, for instance, he resorted to 
conditionality-based language as well: “if your 
nations do not want to see America moderate its 
commitment to the alliance, each of your 
capitals needs to show its support for our 
common defense.”3 
Both legally-codified and political coercion-
based forms of conditionality have their own 
merits and drawbacks. EU Treaty-based 
conditionality has a proven track-record in terms 
of shaping modest policy outcomes, yet only 
operates over a very long time horizon. Precisely 
because it manifests itself through long-winding 
democratic legislative processes, it is widely 
accepted by European populations. However, it 
may be deemed as a frustratingly slow policy 
instrument, and therefore unsuitable to address 
crisis situations. 
In turn, coercive diplomacy offers the promise 
of realising major impact over a much shorter 
period of time, thus exercising great political 
appeal. But as coercive instruments are often 
blunt and crude, they may also backfire, either 
because their strategic design goes amiss, or 
because they can be portrayed by the target state 
as an external threat. Precisely because 
European integration has always been a voluntary 
process of Member States pooling competences 
to attain common objectives, outright coercion 
(that is, beyond the framework of EU law) can 
be seen as contradicting the values that are 
enshrined in the treaties – especially when based 
on the threat of punishment. Even positive 
incentives carry important downsides over the 
long term: as the effect of carrots will inevitably 
wear off over time, ever greater resources will be 
required to satisfy expectations. 
In sum, there is no such thing as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
conditionality. Per definition, there is no 
constitutional democracy or social contract 
without some form of conditionality. Rejecting 
conditionality altogether would provoke our 
architecture of government to crumble into 
pieces: why would citizens accept to pay taxes if 
they cannot count on receiving public services in 
return? At the same time, conditionality 
ultimately embodies political power. Any 
recalibration of conditionality – in the EU or 
elsewhere – risks upsetting political equilibria in 
ways that cannot always be foreseen. As 
European citizens become increasingly aware of 
the impact that EU policies may have, it is fair 
to assume that increased conditionality will not 
go unnoticed. Given the double-edged sword 
that conditionality embodies in terms of building 
(or potentially fracturing) EU cohesion, it is key 
to recognise the different logics that are at play 
in the ways that conditionality can be 
operationalised. 
 
WHAT MECHANISM FOR ENSURING THE 
RULE OF LAW 
While conditionality may relate to different 
policy areas, it is the debate on the protection of 
the rule of law inside the EU that has caught the 
most attention in recent months.4 Concern over 
rule of law backsliding in various EU member 
states has prominently featured in parliamentary 
debate in Belgium as well as elsewhere, ranging 
in scope from the developments in Hungary and 
Poland to the way in which Spanish and Catalan 
authorities attempt to resolve their differences.5 
This is not just about pointing fingers at others: 
there exists substantial debate over the rule of 
law in Belgium itself.6  
This section reviews three distinct mechanisms 
that are all geared towards the protection of the 
rule of law and characterised by different forms 
of conditionality. First, we discuss the debate on 
the invocation of Article 7 TEU. Second, we 
  
 




review the Commission’s proposal of linking 
respect for the rule of law to the EU budget. 
Third, we comment on the Belgian 
government’s proposals to establish a rule of law 
peer review mechanism amongst all Member 
States. 
The constitutional foundations of the rule of law 
in the EU are cemented into Articles 2 and 7 
TEU. Serious breaches of the values enshrined 
in Article 2 TEU may, after due deliberation, 
lead to the suspension of EU membership 
rights. On 20 December 2017, the European 
Commission for the first time triggered an 
Article 7 procedure against Poland in respect to 
concerns that legislative proposals would limit 
the independence of the judiciary and the 
separation of powers in Poland.7 Often 
inaccurately described as the so-called “nuclear 
option”, the Article 7 procedure has effectively 
catapulted the rule of law debate into the public 
spotlight.8  
Without prejudice to the outcome of this 
debate, we can already highlight a handful of 
problems associated with the Article 7 
mechanism. Firstly, it has provoked political 
backlash and further polarization in Poland 
itself. Secondly, any debate on concepts such as 
‘judicial independence’ needs clear definitions, 
yet those are missing from the Treaties.9 While 
the European Court of Justice deserves applause 
for clarifying key issues in its ruling Associaça ̃o 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (Case C-64/16), 
more work lies ahead in spelling out the legal 
details whilst constantly ensuring their societal 
acceptability and effective application.10 Thirdly, 
given that Article 7 (2) presupposes European 
Council action based on unanimity, this approach 
may drag on in time without clear result. The 
political stick is unmistakeable, yet can only be 
wielded at the cost of grave collateral damage in 
terms of Union cohesion. 
The Commission’s proposal for a regulation on 
the protection of the Union's budget in case of 
generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law 
constitutes a novel example of budgetary 
conditionality.11 The risk posed by ineffective 
protection of the rule of law to the EU’s 
financial interests is presented as grounds for 
suspending payments and/or the suspension, 
reduction or prohibition of commitments. 
‘Generalised deficiencies’ include endangering 
the independence of judiciary, failing to prevent, 
correct and sanction arbitrary or unlawful 
decisions by public authorities, or limiting the 
availability and effectiveness of legal remedies. 
What remains unclear is to what extent such 
deficiencies need to fully materialise before a 
decision by reversed qualified majority voting is 
triggered. 
In any case, the threat of financial punishment 
would constitute a tangible alternative to the 
existing Article 7 TEU procedure. At the same 
time, it is unsure whether this proposal will 
materialize into legal reality. While it could 
technically be adopted by qualified majority vote 
on the basis of Article 322 (1)(a) TFEU, it is far 
from guaranteed that the Council would consent 
to establishing the precedent of expanding 
majority voting to rule of law matters based on 
what some would consider to be a Treaty 
loophole. Even when coming into effect, 
budgetary (dis)incentives would still be 
perceived by many to be a form of political 
coercion from Brussels, with all the associated 
cost in terms of cohesion – not the least because 
some Member States are far more dependent on 
EU funding than others.12 In certain respects, 
one could even wonder whether this 
Commission proposal, irrespective of its 
adoption, does not constitute a clever stratagem 
for confronting Member States with their own 
responsibilities. As all policy options available to 
the institutions are progressively being 
exhausted, Member States have to act 
themselves. 
From 2016 onwards, the Belgian government 
has been floating ideas to establish a peer review 
  
 




mechanism on the rule of law.13 The evaluation 
of the annual rule of law dialogue in the autumn 
of 2016 has prompted Belgian authorities to 
develop ideas for strengthening political buy-in 
for Member State-led peer pressure.14 In May 
2018, Prime Minister Charles Michel put his 
weight behind this proposal in his Future of 
Europe speech before the European Parliament.15 
In a nutshell, the Belgian proposal revolves 
around the notion of a peer review mechanism 
amongst all Member States on the basis of 
equality, thus avoiding any impression of 
political hierarchy. Drawing inspiration from the 
system of UN periodic reviews as well as the 
European Semester, all Member States would be 
given a mirror reflecting encouragements as well 
as concerns. In effect, this would constitute a 
soft form of conditionality, linking EU 
membership to regular debate about what it 
means to be a democracy based on the rule of 
law.  
Critics point out that Member States may always 
choose to ignore the comments received from 
their peers. Yet such a Council-driven approach 
would at least transform the current (and rather 
stale) rule of law dialogue into a more 
substantial and procedurally-anchored process. 
Perhaps it would not suffice to prevent rule of 
law backsliding, but it would enhance the mutual 
understanding amongst Member States of each 
other’s positions and help bridging interpretative 
differences about what the rule of law entails. 
 
TOWARDS A WIDER FRAMEWORK 
Neither of the three mechanisms outlined above 
would individually appear to be the single magic 
bullet for solving the rule of law debate. In 
addition, even more conditionality-related 
debates are emerging, such as reform of the 
EU’s cohesion policy and increased financial 
support for Member States hosting larger 
numbers of refugees.16 The general take-away 
may therefore reside in the notion of looking at 
conditionality as a wide framework that needs to 
be balanced and coherent. To this purpose, it 
may also be required to expand the toolbox of 
instruments, for instance by contemplating new 
legal instruments based on Article 70 TFEU, or 
considering the degree to which private 
investment depends on the stable rule of law. 
What constitutes an appropriate balance of 
conditionality-based mechanisms, however, will 
inevitably remain the subject of permanent 
political debate. 
Ever since the Treaty of Rome, the process of 
European integration has revolved around the 
notion of developing closer relations amongst 
peoples and nations through joint adaptation 
and approximating policies. Conditionality based 
on a common legal framework and based on 
continuous political dialogue went hand in hand. 
The gradual emergence and spreading remit of 
Euro-Atlantic institutions represented a package 
deal of free and democratic societies, market-
based economics, commitment to the rule of 
law, and collective defence underwritten by the 
US. Today’s EU budget, in turn, reflects nothing 
more than a balancing act between different 
competing policy priorities that are integrated to 
a greater or lesser extent in the acquis. Even in 
times when various components of this bargain 
are put under stress, the different strands of 
conditionality are not to be considered in 
isolation, but rather as dynamic parameters in a 
system that functions best when different 
political, legal and budgetary elements balance 
with one another. As the preceding discussion 
on the rule of law suggests, a prevailing sense of 
disequilibrium prompts a search for mitigating 
measures, which may include existing as well as 
novel forms of conditionality. 
The proposal to establish a rule of law peer 
review mechanism, for instance, could be 
implemented as a purely political measure in the 
short term, yet would greatly benefit from legal 
and institutional codification over the medium-
term. Under Article 70 TFEU, Member States 
  
 




may conduct “objective and impartial evaluation 
of the implementation of the Union policies” 
relating to the area of freedom, security and 
justice. On this basis, a rule of law monitoring 
mechanism could be formalised by means of a 
legislative act not unlike the six-pack measures 
for macroeconomic surveillance adopted in 
2011. This could delegate a monitoring role to 
the European Commission under the European 
Semester system, yet it could also be based on a 
division of roles amongst Member States, for 
instance by dividing them into groups and 
rotating monitoring and reporting requirements 
amongst Member States at random. Envisaging 
a stronger role for the Council would alleviate 
pressure on the Commission when the latter 
faces a conflict between its different roles. Such 
legal codification would admittedly require a 
substantial amount of time and institutional 
resources, yet it would add much procedural 
detail to the rule of law debate in a way that is 
consistent with democratic processes at the 
national and European level. 
The rule of law could also be served by a variety 
of budgetary mechanisms that differ in multiple 
ways from the existing proposal of the 
European Commission. Rather than punish 
Member States for specific policy behaviour, 
sound financial management could constitute an 
appropriate benchmark. Member States with a 
good track record of financial management and 
accountability could thus benefit from lighter 
administrative procedures, and vice versa. One 
could even point out that this increasingly 
resembles the way in which market dynamics 
may determine private investment allocation. 
On 6 March 2018, the Court of Justice of the 
EU ruled that bilateral investment protection 
treaties are incompatible with EU law 
(Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV, case C-
284/16).17 If intra-EU investor-state dispute 
settlement now needs to be pursued by resorting 
to local courts, future private investment will 
increasingly hinge on the degree of confidence 
that businesses have in the independence of the 
judiciary in different Member States. 
Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that several 
Member State governments submitted 
observations in support of Slovakia’s arguments 
and others in support of Achmea’s claim.18 
What constitutes a coherent balance across 
different applications of EU conditionality is not 
set in stone. Any body of law, or any set of 
political principles, will evolve in function of 
changing circumstances and the historical 
context in which it is set. Even as the Union is 
grappling with multiple difficulties, such as the 
imminent departure of the United Kingdom or 
the increased level of great power competition 
worldwide, it is possible to imagine ways that 
strike a balance between the concerns of all 
Member States. Conditionality is indeed on the 
rise, but this does not serve the purpose of 
dividing the Union. Rather, the aim behind 
conditionality is to bring benefits to all EU 
citizens and to strengthen the Union for coping 
with geopolitical headwinds blowing in and 
beyond the European neighbourhood. In effect, 
this is likely to remain a permanent balancing 
act. Yet if the EU is to survive as an area 
without internal borders, it is imperative to put a 
premium on the preservation of mutual trust.19 
 
CONCLUSION 
The overarching objective of conditionality in 
the EU is to foster integration and cohesion 
amongst the peoples of Europe and their 
Member States. A sound logic of conditionality 
must be about setting incentives in such a way 
that it contributes to this intended outcome. 
Resorting to outright political coercion is 
therefore not appropriate within the European 
Union, but rule of law backsliding is not 
acceptable either. If all Member States are to rely 
on one another in different policy areas, they 
need to have confidence in a level playing field 
guaranteed by impartial institutions and 
  
 




underwritten by the citizenry. In this sense, a 
balanced framework for conditionality not only 
depends on permanent and substantial dialogue 
amongst governments, but also on healthy 
democratic debate amongst all engaged citizens 
of the EU. The Union can only be as strong as 
each of its constitutive components: united the 
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